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Through purposeful introduction of malicious transactions (tracking transactions) into randomly select 
nodes of a (database) graph, soiled and clean segments are identified. Soiled and clean measures 
corresponding those segments are then computed. These measures are used to repose the problem of critical 
database elements detection as an optimization problem over the graph. This method is universally 
applicable over a large class of graphs (including directed, weighted, disconnected, cyclic) that occur in 
several contexts of databases. A generalization argument is presented which extends the critical data 
problem to abstract settings.  
 




When transactions are made with the database, the data elements get modified, added or deleted. 
Evidently, further transactions which access the modified data elements carry the modified 
elements through the database. If the initial transaction is malicious of nature then all transactions 
which use the modified data (now corrupt) carry the malice through the database and corrupt 
other data on the database. Thereby the malice spreads through the entire database and corrupts 
large parts of the data it holds. It is therefore very important to identify and protect the “critical” 
or “sensitive data” elements which may be “most accessed” or “most sought after” data elements.  
 
Since mission critical data protection is prime objective of IT industry, a novel data monitoring 
system is devised ([1]) which gives access to IT personnel to identify anomalous behavior during 
database transactions. For fixed probabilities of accessing the delay-sensitive objects, it is 
shown that partitioning the set of disks is always better than striping in all of the disks 
([2]). A method to measure the extent of information leak and loss of important information is 
proposed [3], which develops a measure for the adversaries of the system. It is shown that 
through finite checks, adversaries of specific families may be related to a probabilistic 
information model.   
 
In this article, we demonstrate that through purposeful introduction of malicious transactions the 
problem of critical data detection is reposed as an optimization problem over graphs. We further 
pose the generalized critical data detection problem and develop methods for introducing 
deterministic and linguistic constraints for the critical data detection.  
 
2. Problem Formulation 
 
Definition 2.1: the database is a weighted directed graph G(V,E). V is the set of vertices, W is the 
set of weights corresponding to the edges E.  
 
For instance, through suitable graphing conventions the log file of the transactions may be 
pictured as a graph. The vertices or nodes may represent the data elements and the edges, the 
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transactions. Weights on the edges may represent a normalized frequency of the corresponding 
transaction. They are assumed positive.  
 
Definition 2.2: Pick a random subset of the nodes V of G(V,E) and purposefully introduce 
malicious (or tracking) transaction into those nodes. The transaction propagates along the edges 
of G(V,E). The subset of the graph affected by the transactions is the soiled segment. The 
unaffected part is the clean segment. The ratio of the sum of weights of the soiled segment to the 
sum of all weights on the graph is the measure of the soiled segment called soiled measure (S).  
 
In the definitions, we consider the most general situation: the graph may possess cycles and may 
be disconnected. The cycles may be counted once while computing the weight contribution from 
their edges. The weights are assumed positive. Clearly, the soiled measure S is a function of the 
graph connectivity. Furthermore, every subset of the nodes has a corresponding soiled measure 
and graph’s connectivity determines that measure. We note that when purposeful malice is 
planted into all nodes of G then trivially the entire graph is soiled while on the other hand a single 
node which soils all of G is the most critical node. Between these extremes, a smallest possible 
subset of the nodes which produces the largest possible soiled measure may be defined as the 
most critical subset of the G. Consequently, we have the following definition  
 
Definition 2.3: A subset V’ of V of n nodes is said to be critical if it is a global maximum of the 
following cost function:  
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where S is the soiled measure due to the n nodes into which purposeful malice is introduced, N is 
the total nodes on the graph.  
 
It is clear from the Definition 2.3 that the two opposing factors of nodes (as small as possible) 
against the soiled measure due to those nodes (as large as possible) cause the cost function F to 
attain a maximum at the critical subset of the G.  A global maximum of F is the “break-even” 
combination of the largest soiled measure against the smallest subset of the nodes the graph may 
admit. The second term at Eqn. (2.1) indicates that larger subsets of the nodes receive less credit 
of being critical subsets. β  is a suitably chosen tuning constant or a function of n and may be set 
according to the scaling requirement of the optimization problem. The function F at Eqn. (2.1) 
may be optimized through any of the random search methods (such as simulated annealing or 
genetic algorithm, [5]). The cost function Eqn. (2.1) provides a clear definition for the idea of the 
critical subset of a graph. Clearly, if G(V,E) admits a single critical node (which soils the entire 
graph) then Eqn. (2.1) attains a maximum at that node (S=1 and the second term is the largest 
possible).  
 
Remarks:  1) Depending upon the data constraints, ease of computation etc, a suitable definition 
for soiled measure may be used. The main objective is to assign a suitable measure to the soiled 
segment. 2) The cost function at Eqn. (2.1) is one of the several possible functions which attains 
maximum at the break even point. For instance, for any K>0, KF is maximum at point P if and 
only if F is maximum at the same point. The choice at Eqn. (2.1) is sufficient for the problem. 3) 
Choice of β  is problem specific, may be positive or otherwise and should preserve the 
interesting sets targeted in the problem.  
 
Example: Consider the graph shown at Fig. 2.1. Applying definition 2.3, the critical subset of the 
graph is the global maximum of the cost function at Eqn. (2.1). Choosing unity for β , the 


















We assume that the weights of the graph are equal to one. Computations with cost function Eqn. 
(2.2) are shown at Table 2.1. The soiled measure shown on the last column indicates that the 
nodes 1,4,6 is the most critical subset (we note that they belong in two different connected sets).  
 
The cost function Eqn. (2.2) may be enhanced to include that less nodes is more preferred. In this 
example, such function may be tailored by choosing ./2)( nn =β  Repeating the computation of 


























The new cost function (Eqn. (2.3)) has determined that the nodes 1,6 is the most critical subset. 
The switch from the result of Table 2.1 is evident.  
 
 












Fig. 2.1 A sample graph whose critical subset is sought 
TABLE 2.1: Cost Function with beta=1 
Serial Number Purposeful malice 
into  Nodes (n) 
Soiled measure 
(S) 
Clean measure E=S2+(1-n/N)2 E 
1 1,6 6/7 1/7 36/49+(1-2/7)2 1.2449 
2 3,5 2/7 5/7 4/49+(1-2/7)2 0.5918 
3 2,4,7 5/7 2/7 25/49+(1-3/7)2 0.8367 
4 2,6 4/7 3/7 16/49+(1-2/7)2 0.8367 
5 1,4,6 7/7 0 1+(1-3/7)2 1.3265 
 




into  Nodes (n) 
Soiled measure 
(S) 
Clean measure E=S2+2/n*(1-n/N)2 E 
1 1,6 6/7 1/7 36/49+2/2*(1-2/7)2 1.2449 
2 3,5 2/7 5/7 4/49+2/2*(1-2/7)2 0.5918 
3 2,4,7 5/7 2/7 25/49+2/3*(1-3/7)2 0.7279 
4 2,6 4/7 3/7 16/49+2/2*(1-2/7)2 0.8367 
5 1,4,6 7/7 0 1+2/3*(1-3/7)2 1.2177 
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Taking cues from the arguments developed in the previous section and the Eqn. (2.1), the idea of 
critical data is extended to the abstract setup of the generalized critical data.  
 




nS ∑+−+ εδγβα 22 )(        (3.1) 
is the generalized critical subset of G(V,E). The δγβα ,,,  and ε  are suitably chosen coefficient 
functions (of n as well as other parameters of the problem) and the Ck are constraints which 
extend the definitions of critical data sets. The coefficient functions map from suitable subsets of 
natural numbers to Real numbers (Complex numbers).  
 
Remarks:  1) through coefficient functions βα , , the function types for the soiled measure and 
the nodes (decreasing function for increasing nodes) may be independently controlled. Essentially 
a desired function may be incorporated for the soiled measure and the nodes terms by setting the 
α and β  accordingly. 2) within admissible limits of the problem, the definition of the critical sets 
may be varied through appropriate choices of δγβα ,,,  and ε . 
 
The constraints Ck augment the cost function through the Lagrange multipliers kε . The 
coefficients δγβα ,,,  and ε  may be chosen according to the design requirements of the 
problem. The constraints Ck may be abstract or even linguistic. The critical data problem is 
generalized through the introduction of the coefficient functions and the constraints which may be 
deterministic or even linguistic. Through optimization of Eqn. (3.1) we pose the “generalized 
critical data detection” problem. For the linguistic case, the augmentation is performed through 
the AND operator and the cost function is implemented as )()( 22 SCONSTRAINTAND
N
nS δγβα −+ . 
This function (for the deterministic or the linguistic case) may be optimized through any of the 
random search methods (such as simulated annealing or genetic algorithm [5]). Fuzzy constraints 
may also be included through the composition rules of Fuzzy logic and implemented through the 
AND operator ([4]). We demonstrate an application of the linguistic constraint with the 
generalized cost function by continuing with the example and seeking critical subsets “within the 
same connected component.”   
 
Example: In continuation of the example at Fig. 2.1, we impose a linguistic constraint that the 
critical subset belongs in the same connected component of the graph. This linguistic constraint is 
implemented through the AND operator thus:  




nSE −+=        (3.2) 
C1, the constraint, is implemented in the following fashion. If the nodes {n1, n2,…,nk} are 
randomly picked then  
C1=1 iff {n1, n2,…,nk} all belong in the same connected component of the graph, else 0.   
(3.3) 
Further the cost function is defined via C1 as:  
22 )1(
N
nSE −+=  iff C1=1; undefined if C1=0.      (3.4) 
 
Table 3.1shows the calculation for the cost function defined through Eqns. (3.3), (3.4). E is not 
defined at the serial numbers 1,2,4,5 because by definition Eqn. (3.4), cost function is undefined 
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wherever C1=0. Consequently, the calculation over connected components has determined that 

















The cost function approach to critical data items detection offers several advantages: 1) globally 
optimal combination (most critical data) is obtained. This is the most critical subset the graph 
may admit. Theoretically, no better combination is possible 2) every possible graph topology is 
included. Be it weighted, directed, disconnected or their combination, simulated annealing 
(random search) includes all. 3) through the language of soiled and clean measures, most analyses 
of the database graph may be reposed conveniently and suitably in terms of cost functions. 4) new 
constraints may be easily and instantly incorporated into the problem by augmenting the cost 
function with the constraint (deterministic or linguistic) and performing the optimization over the 
augmented cost function. For the deterministic case, the Lagrange multiplier method may be used 
for function augmentation. 5) linguistic constraints may also be incorporated and linguistic 
variables may be used for implementing the linguistic constraints (as illustrated in the example, 
using the AND operator) 6) this approach provides flexibility (through various choices of the 
coefficient functions, Eqns (3.1), (3.2)) for the critical data detection problem of databases 7) 
designer’s heuristics and experience with the database may be fruitfully encoded into the 
coefficient functions ( δγβα ,,,  and ε ) for that database. 8) Cost functions provide a unified 
treatment to critical data detection problem over a large class of data sets.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
Through the language of clean and soiled measures, the notion of critical subset of the graph is 
posed as an optimization problem over the graph. Extending further, the generalized critical 
subset is defined as the global maximum of a generalized cost function, obtained by means of a 
function augmentation through Lagrange multipliers. Deterministic and linguistic constraints are 
used for augmenting the given cost function. The optimization approach for critical data detection 
is flexible and includes a wide choice for cost functions for varied data types encountered in 
practice.  
 
The main idea introduced in this article is purposeful introduction of “tracking signals” through 
randomly selected nodes of the graph and associating a measure to the subsets of the graph the 
tracking signals have reached. Using this measure, it is demonstrated that important and 
interesting subsets of the graph may be characterized through a family of optimization problems. 
This approach may be employed in a general setting of the graphs and important subsets may be 





 Nodes (n) 
C1 Soiled 
measure (S) 
Clean measure E=S2+(1-n/N)2 E 
1 1,6 0 6/7 1/7 - - 
2 3,5 1 2/7 5/7 4/49+(1-2/7)2 0.5918 
3 2,4,7 0 5/7 2/7 - - 
4 2,6 0 4/7 3/7 - - 
5 1,4,6 0 7/7 0 - - 
6 1,4 1 5/7 2/7 25/49+(1-2/7)2 1.0204 
7 6 1 2/7 5/7 4/49+(1-1/7)2 0.8163 
8 2,4 1 4/7 3/7 16/49+(1-2/7)2 0.8367 
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detected through the corresponding optimization problems. The tracking signals may be pre-
designed to capture the suitable subsets of the graph. In future publications, author shall 
demonstrate the various applications and extensions of this method (through deterministic, 
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